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lassically important economic analyses made essential .-use of assumptions drawn from expected utility theory. Examples include results on stochastic dominance and risk aversion that were obtained by Pratt (1964), Arrow (1965) , and others. The surprising discovery of Machina (1982) was that these results could be obtained in almost complete generality without requiring assumptions from expected utility theory. Another achievement of expected utility theory was the development of an operational methodology of utility analysis in which simple preference assumptions were shown to characterize tractable families of utilities, like exponential functions and additive functions of several attributes. This analytical power has been extraordinarily useful not only as a theoretical tool, but also in applied decision analyses where domain-specific utilities must be formulated. This paper shows that, once again, results that were developed within the expected utility framework, can be extended to many forms of nonexpected utility. Specifically, characterizations of well known families of parametric utilities can be obtained in prospect theory, in the several rank-dependent theories, in the probability transformation theories of Edwards (1962) and Handa (1977) , and, in effect, in all theories that deal with probabilities in a nonlinear way. Similarly, the standard multiattribute utility results can be extended to the nonexpected utility theories just mentioned. Our characterizations of utility models are based on the weakest assumptions presently available. The assumptions adopted in our analysis are compatible with either an expected or nonexpected utility basis. For expected utility, our results extend Wakker (1989, Section VII.7) to the case of arbitrary intervals.1 We also extend Wakker's results to nonexpected utility models. Our main results also generalize Miyamoto's (1988) analysis of utility models, showing that the classes of utility representations axiomatized within the weak, "generic" utility theory of that paper can be axiomatized on an even weaker, and hence, more general basis. Similarly, we generalize Dyckerhoff (1994) who provided results for the decomposition of multiattribute utilities that were similar to Miyamoto (1988) , and extended these to the multilinear case. For weighted utility and SSB theory, multiattribute decomposition results were given in Fishburn (1984) and characterizations of parametric families (including the linear/exponential family) were given in Fishburn (1994) .
Our results have rather surprising implications for statedependent utility. When standard preference axioms for parametric and multiattribute utilities are combined with assumptions for a state-dependent utility, we find that statedependence is no longer possible. In other words, the assumptions for a state-dependent utility theory, which are strictly weaker than assumptions that imply state-independence, become equivalent in power to state-independence when combined with standard preference axioms for parametric or multiattribute utility models. Whereas the problem of identifying probabilities in a state-dependent utility theory has proven to be quite subtle (Kadane and Winkler 1988) , our main results for state-dependent utility identify unique probabilities. This "solution" is unlikely to be attractive to proponents of state-dependent utility theory, however, because our assumptions eliminate state dependence. What our results show for state-dependent utility is that the development of a viable theory of utility analysis will be more difficult than has previously been recognized,
ELEMENTARY DEFINITIONS
Let {s, t} be a state space, with two distinct states (of nature). One state is the true state, the other is not true; it is not known which state is true. For example, the states might describe the result of tossing a coin, with s referring to heads and t to tails. We consider the general setup of decision under uncertainty, so we neither assume nor preclude that probabilities for s and t are given beforehand. Extensions to more than two states are given in Section 5. Let C denote a set of outcomes, and let C2 = C X C denote the set of acts, i.e., f = (fsn ft) ( C2 is the act yielding f, if s is true and ft if t is true. Throughout the paper, C is a convex subset of IRn, and more specific assumptions about C will be adopted in subsequent sections.
Let > denote a binary relation on C2, whose interpretation is that of a preference relation among acts. We assume that > is a weak order, i.e., it is transitive and complete (for all acts f, g, f > g or g > f ). As usual, we write f> g if f > g but not g > f, f -g if f > g and g > f, f -< g if g > f, and f : g if g > f. Preferences over riskless outcomes are represented as preferences over constant acts. For example, if x, y E C, then x > y is short for (x, x) > (y, y). Our main results concern the set of rankordered acts, denoted C , and defined as the set {fa E C2: As > ft}. Note that this set contains the constant acts.
In Section 5, the utility results of the paper are applied to several utility theories. In all the described applications, there exists an additive representation for > on C2, i.e., there exist functions Us: C -> IR and U,: C -> IR such that the map fi U,(f,) + U,(f) preserves > on C2 . Therefore this additive representation is assumed in the main body of the text; axioms for the representation are stated in Lemma 1 of Appendix A. As an example, we briefly describe the application of our results to rank-dependent utility, which is described more fully in example 3a. On the subset of rank-ordered 50-50 lotteries (0.5, x; 0.5, y) for which x > y, rank-dependent utility evaluates lotteries by the function 4(0.5)U(x) + (1 -4(O.5))U(y), for some "transformed probability" 4(0.5). The rank-ordered 50-50 lotteries are isomorphic to C-, hence the main results of this paper can be applied, resulting in characterizations of parametric and multiattribute utility models for rank-dependent utility.
We assume that the functions Us and U, are continuous, and that both Us and U, preserve the ordering > on C. This implies outcome monotonicity, i.e., for any f, g E C i if ft > g, and ft > gt, then f > g, where the consequent preference is strict if either antecedent preference is strict. The utility assumptions investigated in this paper will imply (and not presuppose) a further decomposition, namely that Us and U, are linear with respect to each other, and hence can be rewritten as Us = 7rU and U, = 7TU, where U: C -> IR. The constants 7r and 7rt are decision weights that are positive and sum to one; the function U is a utility (function). The decision weights need not be interpreted as probabilities; in particular cases, such as in rankdependent utility, the decision weights may have an independent interpretation within a nonexpected utility theory.
We summarize the assumptions of this paper as follows.
Structural Assumption 1. The relation > is a weak order on C2, the set of acts. There exists an additive representation f i-> U5(f5) + Ut(ft) on the rank-ordered set = {(f5, ft) C C2: fs > f}; both Us and Ut are continuous and preserve > on the constant acts.
PARAMETRIC FAMILIES OF UTILITIES
In this section we consider one-dimensional outcomes and assume that larger outcomes are preferred to smaller ones, i.e., for all x, y C C,
x Lynx :y,.
This condition is called monotonicity; it implies strict increasingness of U, and Ut. Our first analysis concerns the characterization of the increasing linear/exponential utilities, defined as the family of utilities U: C -> IR such that one of the following holds:
U: x-aeAx + T, for a > 0, A > 0, andT C IR; 
U: x-aeAX + T, for a < 0, A < 0, and T E IR. Next, we turn to the characterization of the increasing log/power utilities. Let C be a strictly positive interval, i.e., C C IR++ (IR++ denotes the set of strictly positive real numbers). The increasing log/power functions are defined as the family of utilities U: C --IR such that one of the following holds: 
U: x~axA + , forof< 0, A <0, and i EJR. 
MULTIATTRIBUTE UTILITY FOR TWO FACTORS
In this section C -C1 X C2 is a product of two nondegenerate intervals, C1 and C2.3 That is, we deal with two product structures, first, the two-dimensional structure of C that comprises all combinations of the attributes from C1 and C2, and, second, the two-dimensional structure C2 -C x C that comprises the set of acts on the two-element state space {s, t}. Outcomes in C are denoted as x = (x1, It is useful to note that the restriction of mutual utility independence to the constant acts implies that preferences between outcomes are independent of common attributes, i.e., x1c2 > y1c2 X xld2 > yjd2 and clx2 > c1y2 X d1x2 > d1Y2. This is the well known condition of preference independence (see Keeney and Raiffa); for two factors, the topic of this section, it is also implied by attribute monotonicity. Because of monotonicity, the multiplicative form in Theorem 3 does not permit changes of sign, i.e., either U is strictly positive or strictly negative. The general multiplicative form in which zeroes and sign reversals can occur is more complicated on rank-ordered sets; further comments are given in Appendix B.
Theorem 3 identifies sufficient conditions for the existence of an additive or multiplicative representation, but it does not distinguish which of the two representations is valid. In the expected utility framework, it is well known that a condition called marginality is necessary and sufficient for an additive representation of attributes (Fishburn 1965 )-marginality is satisfied if gambles are equal in preference whenever the gambles have identical marginal probability distributions over attributes. This condition cannot be applied in the present analysis because it assumes that the utility of a gamble is linear in probability, and that the expected utility axioms are valid. Indeed, Dyckerhoff showed for rank-dependent utility that the marginality condition implies expected utility. Miyamoto (1988) whenever all acts in question are contained in C2 . Mutual utility independence holds on C2 if Cj is utility independent on C2 for every J C N. As in the two-factor case, the restriction of mutual utility independence to the constant acts implies that preferences between outcomes are independent of common attributes, i.e., xjc > yjc < xjd > yjd. This is preference independence for dimension n : 2. As in the two-factor case, Theorem 4 does not give the most general multiplicative form, because monotonicity excludes zeroes and sign reversals. The general multiplicative form is discussed in Appendix B. In addition, Theorem 4 only identifies sufficient conditions for an additive or multiplicative representation without indicating which representation is valid. Diagnostic conditions that distinguish the additive from the multiplicative representation have been given at the end of Section 3, and generalizations to n factors are straightforward. We will not state these generalizations here.
Next we turn to multilinear utilities, the broadest generalization of the two-dimensional additive/multiplicative case to higher dimensions. U: C -> IR is multilinear if there exist Uk: Ck -> IR for each k E N and real constants, di, for each J C N such that U: x F > EJCN d1 * 1kEGJ Uk(Xk).
In expected utility theory, a utility on n factors is multilinear if and only if each factor is utility independent. The following theorem provides the result under weaker assumptions, thus permitting the extension to several nonexpected utility theories. More general, nonmonotonic, multilinear forms are discussed in Appendix B.
APPLICATIONS AND COMMENTS
The preceding sections have derived standard utility results from a rather slender basis, namely, that there exists an additive representation for the preference relation on the rank-ordered acts, C2 . The results show that familiar utility representations can be characterized by the usual assumptions when the assumptions are restricted to rankordered acts. These results are robust against many of the violations of expected utility theory because violations are typically demonstrations that preference behavior is inconsistent with the global claims of expected utility theory, e.g., with the claim that decision weights are identical to stated probabilities and that strong independence assumptions like the sure-thing principle hold. Our results show that axiomatizations of standard parametric and multiattribute utility representations require only the locally additive structure within rank-ordered subsets of binary lotteries or two-outcome acts, and not the full power of expected utility theory. Hence, the techniques of this paper make possible the generalization of standard utility results to any of the so-called generalized expected utility theories that imply additive representations within rank-ordered subsets. This section gives several examples to substantiate this claim.
To bring out similarities between different utility theories, it is useful to define a common notation, terminology, and set of assumptions. We follow the standard terminology in distinguishing between decision under risk (DUR) and decision under uncertainty (DUU). In DUR, the preference relation > applies to a set P of probability distributions over C. For simplicity, we assume throughout that P is the set of lotteries, i.e., probability distributions assigning a 1.0 probability to a finite subset of C. The notation (Pl, xl; ... ; PM. xm) denotes a lottery yielding outcome xi with probability pj for all j; we use superscripts to distinguish outcomes, because subscripts already refer to attributes of outcomes. Except in example 2, we assume that outcome monotonicity holds, i.e., if xk , yk for every k, then (Pl, x;... ; Pm, XM) > (pi, y1; ... ; PM, ym), where the consequent preference is strict if Pk> 0 and Xk > yk for some k. For any 0 < p < 1, let C"P denote the set of lotteries of the form (p,x; 1 -p,y), where x,y E C and x My. CP" is isomorphic to C2 under the mapping (p, x; 1 -p, y) (x, y). In all of the DUR theories to be discussed, there exists an additive representation for > on C"PI, so that our main results can be applied under the appropriate regularity conditions.
In the case of DUU, the preference relation is over acts, which are functions from a state space S to the outcome set C. Subsets of S are called events. For simplicity of presentation we assume a finite state space S -{s1, . ... In all of the examples, we will indicate how a given utility theory implies an additive representation on a substructure of the form C"b or C41. Our main results can be applied to such an additive representation under appropriate regularity conditions. In each example, the characterizing preference conditions, when imposed on all acts, obviously imply the preference conditions when restricted to substructures CPI or C4, thus imply the restrictions for the utilities as obtained before. Note that it actually suffices, for application of the utility implications derived before, that the preference conditions have been established only on one two-dimensional substructure CP or C . Conversely, if the utilities are as described in the theorems above, then it is easy to show (and will not be elaborated here) that the preference conditions do not only hold on all substructures CP' or C4, but are extended naturally to the entire domain. In that manner, the following examples show how standard utility models can be characterized within the respective utility theories. As an illustration, we make the implied characterization explicit in example 3a, where rank-dependent utility is considered for the context of risk. Example lb. Subjective expected utility for DUU (Savage 1954 ). According to this theory, there exists a utility U: C --IR, and a probability measure P on S that represent preferences over acts through the expected utility formula. Take any fixed event A C S such that 0 < P(A) < 1. The function (A, x; Ac, y) -* P(A)U(x) + (1 -P(A))U(y) is an additive representation on C41 to which our utility characterizations apply.
Examples la and lb add nothing new to the methodology of utility analysis, for the utility characterizations were proved much earlier in the expected utility and subjective expected utility framework. We mention these examples because they make clear the similarity between the utility analytic methods in these older theories, and in the theories discussed later.
Example ic. State-dependent subjective expected utility for DUU (Karni 1985 (Karni , 1992 where P is a probability measure and U is a statedependent utility function, so-called because the utility of an outcome depends on the state with which it is associated. For each state s, U(, s) is assumed to be continuous. A much discussed problem with this model is that only the products P(si)U f(si), si) are inferrible from preferences, whereas the components, P(si) and U(f(si), si), are not separately identifiable (Dreze 1987, Karni 1985 , 1992 , Kadane and Winkler 1988 . To see why this is the case, choose an arbitrary positive number for each state, multiply P(si) by that number, divide U(f(si), si) by that same number, and finally renormalize the probabilities. The result is another model that describes exactly the same preferences. Thus, probabilities and utilities are not separately identifiable. We pursue this example in some detail because our main results provide an avenue by which probabilities can be obtained.
Define Uj: x F-> P(sj)U(x, s1) for all j. For convenience, we can choose an arbitrary fixed outcome, r E C, and set Uj(r) = 0 for all j. The set C11'} contains all acts ({sj}, x; {Sj}C, y) with x > y. The function Uj(x) + Yinj Ui(y) is a continuous additive representation on Cljs}. Suppose that we now assume any of the parametric or multiattribute utility axioms of this paper. Then our main results establish that Eij Ui(x) =aUj(plus (attribute) monotonicity x) + /3 for some a > 0 and (3, and every x E C. Define U*: x ET 1 Ui(x). Noting that 0 = Einj Ui(r) =3, we have U*(x) = Uj(x) + aUj(x) for any x E C. Hence, Uj = ) rjU where iTrj11(1 + a) > 0. As this holds for every j, 1 -j S m, the function f -* zM-rnTU*t(f(s1)) is a stateindependent representation for the preference order over acts. Finally, the rj's may be renormalized to sum to one. Thus, the addition of stan-dard parametric or multiattribute utility assumptions to a state-dependent subjective expected utility theory yields an expected utility model with decision weights that satisfy the conditions for probabilities. Of course, it also yields the specification of the specific utility model. Whether the decision weights derived in this analysis can be interpreted as genuine probabilities is, as always, open to debate. On either GPl or LPN, our main results apply to yield characterizations of parametric or multiattribute utility models within prospect theory.
We mention that Kahneman and Tversky treat the distinction between gains and losses as a psychological primitive. The sets GP, and LPI are sets of pure-gain and pureloss lotteries, respectively. Thus, our main results yield separate parametric or multiattribute utility axiomatizations for gains and for losses, allowing, for instance, that preferences for pure-gain lotteries GC7 satisfy constant relative risk aversion, but not preferences for pure-loss lotteries LP', or that both gains and losses satisfy constant relative risk aversion, but with a power that is different for gains than for losses; such models were discussed in Tversky (1967). 
where i. Mutual utility independence holds (whenever some attributes are fixed at certain levels, then preferences over lotteries over the remaining attributes are independent of the levels just described), if and only if U is an additive/multiplicative utility. ii. Each factor Ck is utility independent (whenever all but one of the attributes are fixed at certain levels, then preferences over lotteries over the remaining attribute are independent of the levels just described), if and only if U is a multilinear utility. 
As before, for arbitrary lotteries, the outcomes must first be rank-ordered, and then (17) that is, to rank-dependent utility. Here continuity of U follows from continuity of V in outcome, furthermore, if V is continuous in probability then so is w, and, finally, joint monotonicity of V implies that w is strictly increasing. 6 We find again that, as soon as this model deviates from rank-dependent utility, the classical utility characterizations are no longer possible. Let us point out one more reason why it is possible to generalize standard results of utility analysis to theories based on rank-ordered sets of the form C2, and thus to many models that deviate from expected utility theory. The characterizing conditions are compatible with rankordered sets in the following sense: In each characterizing condition, the acts in the antecedent preference are rankordered if and only if the acts in the consequent preference are similarly rank-ordered. This point is obvious, e.g., in the case of constant absolute risk aversion which asserts that x > y if and only if x + E > y + E. In the case of utility independence assumptions, it was noted that mutual utility independence implies preferential independence. Thus, for example, for two dimensions we have x1c > y1c if and only if x1d > y1d, so that a rank-ordered set can be defined on the first attribute without regard to the elements chosen from the second (or other) attributes; this is used at several places in the proofs. Axioms for standard parametric and multiattribute utility models retain their logical force when restricted to rank-ordered sets because the constraints that they impose on preferences apply to lotteries within the same rank-ordered sets.
Finally, we note that the results in this paper have been presented in the framework of DUR/DUU, with the sj's referring to states of nature, but we could equally well treat the sj's as referring to persons or to points of time, in which case results for welfare theory or for temporal discounting would obtain.
CONCLUSION
Our main results provide to the best of our knowledge the most general characterization of linear/exponential and log! power utility models, and the additive, multiplicative, and multilinear utility models within theories of DUR and DUU. What is new in our results is not the axioms used to characterize these utility models, but the finding that standard axioms yield the familiar utility models when added to a variety of nonexpected utility theories. Our results suggest that much of the methodology of utility analysis, as embodied in texts like Keeney and Raiffa (1976) and von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986), can be developed upon nonexpected utility foundations. 
APPENDIX A. CHARACTERIZATIONS ENTIRELY IN TERMS OF PREFERENCES

APPENDIX B. RELAXING ATTRIBUTE MONOTONICITY
For simplicity of presentation, attribute monotonicity was assumed in the study of multiattribute utility. There is interest, however, in nonmonotonic models, for instance, if preferences on some attributes are single-peaked or if some attributes are not numerical. As another example, consider a health utility model over survival duration and health quality. People prefer longer survival to shorter survival in good health states, but the opposite preference can occur when the health state is extremely bad. Hence, preference for survival duration is neither uniformly increasing nor uniformly decreasing.
A simple way to relax attribute monotonicity is to invoke preferential independence of single attributes and an essentiality assumption. An attribute j is essential on C2 if xjc > yjc for some xjc, yjc E C2 . If attribute monotonicity is dropped from the assumptions of Theorems 3, 4, and 5, and replaced by the assumption that at least two attributes are essential, then statements i of those theorems imply the corresponding statements ii; of course utility independence, which is asserted in the statements i, implies preferential independence of single attributes. The converse implications from statements ii to statements i are no longer valid because the multiplicative or multilinear forms can produce sign reversals. Sign reversals are precluded if single attributes are preferentially independent. Under preferential independence of single attributes, one can suppress the inessential attributes and rescale the essential attributes so that attribute monotonicity is satisfied. Then the results follow from those in this paper. In summary, statements i and ii of Theorems 3, 4, and 5 are equivalent if attribute monotonicity is replaced by the assumption that at least two attributes are essential and Cj is preferentially independent on C2 for every j; Dyckerhoff gave this result for rank-dependent utility and Choquetexpected utility.
In general multiplicative and multilinear forms, sign reversals are possible. For expected utility, this case can be characterized by a weakening of utility independence to a "generalized utility independence," as advanced by Keeney (1974, 1975) for expected utility; see also von Stengel (1993). For our context, the generalization seems more complicated. The reason is that the generalized utility independence conditions are not compatible with rank-ordering: A crucial point for the derivation of the results in this paper was that all preference conditions that we used did not affect rank-ordering.
For the multiattribute results, there is also interest in nonnumerical attributes; for example, attributes of health may not have a quantitative description. In this case, essentiality and preferential independence conditions replace attribute monotonicity, and a richness condition is imposed to guarantee that the range of representing functions is an interval, e.g., through continuity with respect to a connected topology.
APPENDIX C. PROOFS
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof that statement i of the theorem is necessary for statement ii is routine, and will be omitted. Therefore, let us assume that statement i holds, and prove that statement ii holds. By Lemma 1, statement ii of the theorem is proved if we can prove it for the case where C is open, therefore we assume that C is open. For any E C IR', let CE {x E C: x + E C C}, and letJ = { E C IRt: CE is a nondegenerate interval}. Because C is a nondegenerate interval, J is also a nondegenerate interval. 8. Here we use the implication of utility independence that, by the definition of >1, (C1)' is a rank-ordered set. 9. Note that (C2)2 is a rank-ordered set.
